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ARGUMENT 
I. The settlors clearly intended to prohibit each other from 
cutting the other1s children out of the picture. 
Defendants do not dispute that interpretation of the 
Declaration of Trust at issue in this case requires a 
determination of the settlors1 intent, see Makoff v. Makoff, 528 
P.2d 797, 798 (Utah 1974), or that 
[i]n ascertaining the intention of the settlor[s] [this 
Court] may consider the entire instrument aided by the 
surrounding circumstances existing at the time of creation 
of the trust. 
Id. (emphasis added). Nevertheless, in part IIC of their 
Argument, defendants contend that the limitation in the 
Declaration of Trust that "[i]f one of the above listed should be 
deceased, the beneficiaries cannot be changed" (R.7) applies only 
to the surviving settlor and not to the surviving trustee. 
According to defendants, 
[plaintiffs1] argument that the trust addendum which 
provides that following the death of one of the co-settlors 
that the beneficiaries cannot be changed has no bearing on 
whether a sole surviving trustee can convey realty and 
thereby terminate the trust with respect to that realty; the 
sale of trust property is a power exercisable only by a 
trustee while the naming of beneficiaries is a right solely 
exercisable by a settlor.^ 
While this argument may have some academic appeal, it 
requires either that the settlors' intention be completely 
ignored or a determination that the settlors1 intention was 
absurd. Under the Declaration of Trust, Joseph and Rhoda Thurber 
each wore two separate hats: that of a settlor and that of a 
xReply [sic] Brief of Appellees at 9-10. 
1 
trustee. Acceptance of defendants' interpretation of the 
language of the addendum would require a determination that 
Josephfs and Rhodaf s intent was not to prevent each other from 
depriving the other's children of their beneficial interests in 
the trust, but, rather, that if one of them did decide to deprive 
the other's children of their beneficial interests, he or she 
would be required to do so not with his or her surviving 
settlor's hat on, but with his or her surviving trustee's hat on. 
Picture Joseph and Rhoda sitting around the fire one cold winter 
evening long ago quietly discussing the terms of the trust which 
they were contemplating establishing for their beloved children. 
Joseph says to Rhoda, "Rhoda, after I die, if you decide that you 
don't want my daughter to receive any of our property, that's 
okay; I don't mind. But, I don't want you to do it by changing 
the beneficiaries of our trust. I want you to put on your 
surviving trustee's hat, sell all of our property and give all 
the proceeds to your kids." And Rhoda responds, "Okay dear, that 
sounds a little peculiar to me, but whatever you say." 
That, of course, is not what happened. Defendants have 
never disputed, and the trial court specifically determined, that 
Joseph and Rhoda "wanted to set up a trust that would not be 
changed after one [of them] died." (R.127, pp.20-21). It would 
certainly not have mattered to Joseph and Rhoda whether it was 
the surviving settlor's powers or those of the surviving trustee 
that were used to do the changing. They did not want the 
survivor to be able to change the trust, period. 
2 
In short, acceptance of defendants1 contention that the 
Declaration of Trust's limitation on the changing of 
beneficiaries applies only to the settlors1 powers and not to 
those of the surviving trustee would require that Joseph's and 
Rhoda's intent be ignored and should be rejected. 
II. Defendants misread West, 
In part III of their Argument, defendants assert that the 
West2 "Court found that Herschel West was the sole active 
beneficiary of the trust, and as such, Herschel West could 
terminate the trust as a trustee without violating any fiduciary 
duty to a named beneficiary."3 That is clearly not the case. 
The precise ruling in West is as follows: 
...we conclude that Herschel West, Sr., as sole trustee, 
could sell or dispose of the property as he saw fit. This 
involved no breach of his fiduciary duty since he was at 
that point the sole beneficiary. 
948 P.2d at 356 (emphasis added). 
The determinative factor was that Herschel was the "sole 
beneficiary," not, as defendants contend, that he was the sole 
"active" beneficiary. The West court's ruling that Herschel was 
the sole beneficiary was based upon its determination that "[t]he 
trust instrument is clear that the children do not become 
^Matter of Estate of West, 948 P.2d 351 (Utah 1997). 
^Reply Brief of Appellees at 12 (emphasis added). 
4The Court did, of course, also characterize Herschel West 
as an "active" beneficiary. 948 P. 2d at 3 55. However, its 
discussion in that regard was simply to establish that he was in 
fact a beneficiary at all in light of the fact that "the trust 
instrument does not specifically name [him and his first wife] as 
beneficiaries." Id. 
3 
beneficiaries until the ^death of the survivor1 of the two 
settlors." 948 P.2d at 355 (emphasis added). As discussed in 
Appellants1 Opening Brief, however, the language of the 
Declaration of Trust at issue in the case at bar is 
determinatively different from the language of the trust 
instrument at issue in West. Unlike the trust instrument at 
issue in West, there is no provision that plaintiffs were not to 
become beneficiaries until the "death of the survivor" of the two 
settlors. To the contrary, the language of Joseph and Rhoda 
Thurbers1 Declaration of Trust is very clear that plaintiff's 
became beneficiaries on the date of its execution, April 1, 1980. 
Defendants attempt to minimize this distinction by 
characterizing it as having "two serious flaws: one textual and 
one rational." Explaining the so-called "textual flaw," 
defendants direct the court's attention to language found not in 
the part of the Declaration of Trust which identifies the 
beneficiaries, as was the case in West, but in the following 
sentence which addresses termination of the trust: 
Upon the death of the survivor of us, unless all the 
beneficiaries shall predecease us or unless we shall die as 
a result of a common accident or disaster, our Successor 
Trustee is hereby directed forthwith to transfer said 
property and all right, title and interest in and to said 
property unto the beneficiaries absolutely and thereby 
terminate this trust... 
(R.6)(emphasis added). 
In short, while the words "death of the survivor of us" do 
appear in the Declaration of Trust at issue in this case, they 
5Reply Brief of Appellees at 12. 
A 
appear in a completely different context than they do in West 
and, unlike the situation in West, they have nothing to do with 
establishing the date upon which plaintiffs became beneficiaries. 
In support of what they refer to as the "rational flaw/' 
defendants contend that plaintiffs "have ignored the West 
analysis entirely."^ According to defendants, because Rhoda 
retained the right to receive income and manage the trust 
property for her own benefit the possibility existed that Rhoda 
could have completely exhausted the trust corpus without ever 
having to resort to her power to revoke the trust. Apparently, 
what defendants are suggesting is that plaintiffs would have been 
no better off if Rhoda had simply used all of the trust res for 
her own benefit, rather than transferring it to defendants. 
That may or may not be the case. However, that is not what 
happened. What happened is that Rhoda did exactly what she and 
Joseph agreed not to do: deprive each others1 children of their 
beneficial interests in the trust after one of them died. 
Distilled to its essence, defendants1 position is that West 
stands for the proposition that any time you have a revocable 
trust "designed primarily to avoid the entanglements often 
associated with the probate process [and the settlors/trustees] 
reserve[] and retain[] extensive and broad powers under the 
trust, not only to revoke the trust itself, but to utilize the 
trust corpus for their own benefit while they [are] still 
~Reply Brief of Appellees at 15. 
5 
living,'" then under such circumstances the trustees owe no 
fiduciary duty to the named beneficiaries. The short answer to 
this position is that if that is what the West court had in mind, 
it would have been very easy for it to have said so. It did not. 
As indicated above, what it did say was that when Herschel West 
quit-claimed his home to himself and his second wife, "he was at 
that point the sole beneficiary," of his and his first wife's 
trust. Accordingly, at that point there were no other 
beneficiaries to whom a fiduciary duty might be owed. The same 
cannot be said in the case at bar. Plaintiffs were clearly 
present beneficiaries to whom Rhoda Thurber owed fiduciary 
duties. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, plaintiffs respectfully request that 
the trial court's order granting summary judgment in favor of 
defendants be reversed and that this case be remanded to the 
trial court with instructions for the entry of summary judgment 
in favor of plaintiffs with respect to their conversion claim. 
a DATED t h i s J_T day of January, 2 000, 
Scott B. Mltchel. 
JVt£t>rney for P l a i n t i f f s 
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